Abstract: We develop a non-Downsian probabilistic voting model where candidates compete by running campaign ads in different media markets. Ads are viewed by everyone within a media market and cannot be targeted to subgroups such as undecided voters or partisans of one candidate. Based on observable factors, candidates can estimate the distribution of voter preference intensities in a media market, and campaign ads then shift this distribution. Due to unobservable factors, individuals with any intensity vote with some probability for each candidate. We derive comparative static implications of changes in such factors as the mix and intensities of partisans in a market on the advertising decisions of a candidate. Using campaign advertising data from governor and senate races in the US in 2002, we find these results to be consistent with actual campaign allocation behavior. In addition, the empirical results also shed insight into whether union members have become swing voters and whether voting behavior in the South continues to differ significantly from the rest of the country.