Detecting Collusion
Did the Soviets
Collude? A Statistical Analysis of Championship Chess 1940-78 (with John Nye),
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2009), 70 (1-2): 10-21.
Abstract: We expand the set of outcomes considered by the
tournament literature to include draws and use games from post-war chess
tournaments to see whether strategic behavior can be important in such
scenarios. In particular, we examine whether players from the former
Retailer Entry
Conditions and Wholesaler Conduct: The theatrical distribution of motion
pictures (prior version was "Testing for Collusion" and before
that "Measuring Market Power"), complete version linked but a shorter
version is forthcoming in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2008), 26(4): 966-84.
Abstract: I add to the empirical literature on vertical
contracting and wholesaler conduct by using retailer entry conditions to infer
unobserved choice variables and equilibrium responses to prices and
advertising. After estimating the
A New Test for
Monopoly with Limited Cost Data, Economics Letters (2012), 117: 891-4.
Abstract: The test’s intuition is
that demand estimates in isolation may diverge from demand estimates under
joint estimation with cost if the monopoly null hypothesis is false.
Simulations indicate that the test can have substantial power using duopoly
data. (355 Kb, December 2012)